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This responsive commentary was suggested by certain implica-
tions of Richard Gabriel's article, "No Light in the Tunnel: Can 
U.S. Unconventional Forces Meet the Future?"1 His article sets forth 
a paradox: that the most likely form of future conflict involving the 
U.S. will be an unconventional "guerrilla" war. Yet the U.S. has, in 
the face of this prediction, systematically dismantled and hindered 
the formation of unconventional warfare units. Gabriel concludes 
that the U.S. is, "unlikely . . , to rebuild its capacity to conduct 
unconventional warfare operations short of having to engage in 
them."2 His thesis suggests that this failure in strategic judgment 
invites future difficulties in Central American and a repeat of 
Vietnam. 
Gabriel suggests two ways in which the U.S. hinders the for-
mation and continuation of unconventional warfare units. First, the 
government immediately dismantles unconventional units at the 
conclusion of armed conflict, and second, there is the problem of 
military careerism.3 He further describes a political motivation be-
hind these actions by government. He cites the notorious "Morosco" 
affair as essentially a public relations difficulty for the Pentagon. 
The "Morosco" catalyst then initiated the political response of un-
conventional force dessication.4 Gabriel proves his proposition well 
by noting that there were about twenty unconventional warfare 
units during the Vietnam conflict and today fewer than nine exist, 
"struggling to keep alive."5 
In fact, a better and longer factual history of the policy of 
dismantling can be made. This policy of immediately dissolving such 
unconventional units has been in place long before Vietnam. The 
Askari Units in the Italo-Ethopia war in 1935-366 were dismantled: 
so were with the U.S. Rangers 7 at the end of the Korean conflict.8 
The impulse to dismantle appears to approach an imperative among 
military planners, a response we can observe and predict. The 
Pentagon response of destroying such units cannot be explained 
away merely in terms of the embarrassment caused by the killing 
of two suspected Viet Cong spies (the "Morosco affair") by U.S. 
Special Forces. Nor is mere military conservatism a satisfactory 
explanation.9 
Today's defense structure also proves Gabriel's contentions on 
careerism in the Western military establishment; quantity counts 
over quality. James Fallows calls this "the culture of procurement,"10 
the more the better and the bigger the better. Careerism,11 the 
practice of advancing one's own career at the cost of personal or 
professional integrity, is a related phenomenon. The very nature of 
unconventional units, small semi-autonomous groups and- without 
great opportunity for promotion make such units the "kiss of death 
for any officer truly interested in rising to the top."12 Unconven-
tional units are not conducive to rising to the top because the units 
are small, require extensive training and skill, and, more impor-
tantly, cohesion. The latter is perverted by the desire to have rank 
rather than use it. Fallows discusses this occurrence as "up or out" 
and that one should "command a unit as quickly as possible but not 
for too long, for that might prevent moving on."13 
None of these explanations is entirely satisfying. And worse, 
they suggest a cynicism in military thinking that goes unproved. 
There are explanations beyond these in the ethico-legal realm. 
Ethics and law are not foreign areas to the military hierarchy. 
There may be a legitimate fear of semi-autonomous elite units. 
These units, because of specialized training and capability, may 
become a Praetorian Guard or even an S.S., capable of threatening 
a democratic state. Autonomy, low cost and the esprit de corps of the 
elite can be turned against government. There may be more than 
a cynical and public relations-sensitive cabal behind the history of 
dismantling. 
We can also find an explanation in the history of military 
theory. Von Clausewitz suggested a spectrum running from nego-
tiation to war in order to resolve conflicts between nations.14 Von 
Clausewitz powerfully influenced Western military thinking. The 
Von Clausewitz roots are visible in what has developed as the "Law 
of Land Warfare." Von Clausewitz was however nearly silent on the 
subject of unconventional warfare and as a result we find rules 
regarding its conduct absent from the "Law of Land Warfare." In 
fact, the 'rules' are not triggered until the U.S. recognizes the 
insurgent or assaultive group as belligerents.15 This leaves the area 
between negotiations and outright warfare rather vague as to rules 
of unconventional conflict. It is no surprise, then, that military 
planners are loathe to devise military operations in a legal limbo. 
The most troublesome mandate of the "Law of Land Warfare" is 
the requirement of a hierarchy of discipline and thus responsibil-
ity.16 Even modes of dress and the manner of the bearing of arms 
are governed.17 All of this works quite nicely as a derivation of 
chivalry, tempered by the intellectual rigor of Von Clausewitz. Lines 
of authority, supervision and responsibility run clearly from pla-
toons through companies, battalions, brigades, divisions and armies. 
The military planner has a right to be ethically concerned with 
semi-autonomous, small units, estranged from the chain of com-
mand that the law assumes.18 The "mad major" factor of fiction 
and failsafe systems becomes a reality for the ethical planner.19 
None of this is to say that Gabriel is wrong. In fact, he is quite 
correct. What is suggested here is not a different, but an additional 
analysis of observed history. The answer lies in recognizing his 
observations as true, and wrenching unconventional warfare from 
a lawless limbo and into an ethical construct. 
18 
Recent United Nation protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention 
were at first greeted with horror as a legalization of terrorism by 
some commentators.20 These protocols, dealing with wars of na-
tional liberation, represent an inroad of international law into the 
limbo which is the legacy of Von Clausewitz.21 We suggest here a 
six phase progression parallel to and perhaps within the spectrum 
of Von Clausewitz: 
Phase I Common criminality or sociopathic violence 
Phase II Terrorism 
Phase III Insurgency 
Phase IV Belligerency 
Phase V Civil War 
Phase VI Governance 
The emphasis here is not on the scientific observation of conflict 
as dispute resolution (Von Clausewitz), but upon the progression 
from powerlessness to power (governance) within a nation state. 
Governed nation states have little difficulty understanding the 
"Law of Land Warfare," enforcing it and punishing its transgressors. 
Neither is there great difficulty in a basic understanding that the 
sovereign state can and should deal with common criminality within 
its borders. As we progress backwards along our spectrum, the legal 
and ethical questions present themselves. The U.N. protocols are a 
mere first step of law encroaching into, and hopefully defining, the 
troublesome middle ground of insurgency and terrorism. This is an 
imperative since unconventional forces are most frequently either 
the insurgents or the counterinsurgents and sometimes the terror-
ists. 
The light in Gabriel's tunnel is law and ethics and not merely 
political machinations of the military. 
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